Why God is probably good: a response to the evil-god challenge. Issue 3 (September 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: MILLER, CALUM
• Is Part Of: Religious studies. Volume 57:Issue 3(2021)
• Page Start: 448
• Page End: 465
• Publication Date: 2021-09
• Subjects: Religion -- Periodicals; Theology -- Periodicals; 200
• DOI: 10.1017/S0034412519000465
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0034-4125

Abstract

Abstract: A number of philosophers have recently defended the evil-god challenge, which is to explain relevant asymmetries between believing in a perfectly good God and believing in a perfectly evil god, such that the former is more reasonable than the latter. In this article, I offer a number of such reasons. I first suggest that certain conceptions of the ontology of good and evil can offer asymmetries which make theism a simpler hypothesis than 'maltheism'. I then argue that maltheism is itself complex in a variety of ways: it is difficult to articulate a simple precise version of maltheism; maltheism posits a mixture of positive and negative properties; maltheism posits a more complex relationship between moral motivation, practical reason and action; and maltheism relevantly parallels other epistemically 'complex' sceptical scenarios.