Bandits in the lab. Issue 3 (26th July 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hoelzemann, Johannes; Klein, Nicolas
• Is Part Of: Quantitative economics. Volume 12:Issue 3(2021)
• Page Start: 1021
• Page End: 1051
• Publication Date: 2021-07-26
• Subjects: Dynamic public‐good problem -- strategic experimentation -- exponential bandits -- learning -- dynamic games -- laboratory experiments; C73 -- C92 -- D83 -- O32; Economics, Mathematical -- Periodicals; Econometrics -- Periodicals; Economics -- Periodicals; 330.0151
• DOI: 10.3982/QE1389
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1759-7323

Abstract

Abstract : We experimentally implement a dynamic public‐good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free‐riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more complex behaviors than predicted by the welfare‐optimal equilibrium, such as noncut‐off behavior, lonely pioneers, and frequent switches of action.