A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism. (11th June 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Jackson, Elizabeth
• Is Part Of: Episteme. Volume 18:Number 2(2021)
• Page Start: 313
• Page End: 327
• Publication Date: 2021-06-11
• Subjects: Doubt, -- Epistemic Supererogation, -- Evidence, -- Permissivism, -- Pragmatic Encroachment, -- Rationality, -- Salience, -- Uniqueness; Social epistemology -- Periodicals; 121
• DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.19
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1742-3600

Abstract

Abstract: Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I show how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling objection. I conclude that IaBP is a view that philosophers should take seriously.