A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism. (11th June 2021)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism. (11th June 2021)
- Main Title:
- A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism
- Authors:
- Jackson, Elizabeth
- Abstract:
- Abstract: Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I show how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling objection. I conclude that IaBP is a view that philosophers should take seriously.
- Is Part Of:
- Episteme. Volume 18:Number 2(2021)
- Journal:
- Episteme
- Issue:
- Volume 18:Number 2(2021)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 18, Issue 2 (2021)
- Year:
- 2021
- Volume:
- 18
- Issue:
- 2
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2021-0018-0002-0000
- Page Start:
- 313
- Page End:
- 327
- Publication Date:
- 2021-06-11
- Subjects:
- Doubt, -- Epistemic Supererogation, -- Evidence, -- Permissivism, -- Pragmatic Encroachment, -- Rationality, -- Salience, -- Uniqueness
Social epistemology -- Periodicals
121 - Journal URLs:
- http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/ ↗
- DOI:
- 10.1017/epi.2019.19 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 1742-3600
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital Store
- Ingest File:
- 18254.xml