Can environmental governance lower toxic emissions? A panel study of U.S. high‐polluting industries. (21st January 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kanashiro, Patricia
• Is Part Of: Business strategy and the environment. Volume 29:Number 4(2020)
• Page Start: 1634
• Page End: 1646
• Publication Date: 2020-01-21
• Subjects: agency theory -- corporate governance -- environmental board -- environmental compensation -- environmental governance -- institutional theory -- propensity score matching -- toxic emissions; Industrial management -- Environmental aspects -- Periodicals; Industries -- Environmental aspects -- Periodicals; 658.4083
• DOI: 10.1002/bse.2458
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0964-4733

Abstract

Abstract: Firms have increasingly adopted environmental governance mechanisms in the form of environmental compensation and environmental board committees. The current study examines the argument that such environmental governance mechanisms contribute to lower toxic emissions in high‐polluting industries. The sample comprises firms that were part of the S&P 500 from the years 2006 to 2011 and were mandated to report toxic emissions to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under the Toxic Release Inventory program. A panel regression model with propensity score matching was employed to minimize endogeneity bias. The results indicate that environmental compensation is a compelling incentive to motivate managers to invest in long‐term and highly uncertain environmental projects. Likewise, the presence of an environmental board committee appears to be significant, suggesting that directors contribute to a firm's strategy with their expertise and political influence. This research also found evidence supporting the cumulative adoption of both environmental governance mechanisms in enhancing environmental performance and the firm's legitimacy.