One principle and three fallacies of disability studies. Issue 6 (1st December 2001)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Harris, John
• Is Part Of: Journal of medical ethics. Volume 27:Issue 6(2001)
• Page Start: 383
• Page End: 387
• Publication Date: 2001-12-01
• Subjects: Disability -- impairment -- handicap -- equality -- social conception of disability -- harmed condition conception of disability; Medical ethics -- Periodicals; 174.2
• DOI: 10.1136/jme.27.6.383
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0306-6800

Abstract

Abstract : My critics in this symposium illustrate one principle and three fallacies of disability studies. The principle, which we all share, is that all persons are equal and none are less equal than others. No disability, however slight, nor however severe, implies lesser moral, political or ethical status, worth or value. This is a version of the principle of equality. The three fallacies exhibited by some or all of my critics are the following: (1) Choosing to repair damage or dysfunction or to enhance function, implies either that the previous state is intolerable or that the person in that state is of lesser value or indicates that the individual in that state has a life that is not worthwhile or not thoroughly worth living. None of these implications hold. (2) Exercising choice in reproduction with the aim of producing children who will be either less damaged or diseased, or more healthy, or who will have enhanced capacities, violates the principle or equality. It does not. (3) Disability or impairment must be defined relative either to normalcy, "normal species functioning", or "species typical functioning". It is not necessarily so defined.