A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Feedback in Ideation Contests. Issue 2 (11th November 2019)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Feedback in Ideation Contests. Issue 2 (11th November 2019)
- Main Title:
- A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Feedback in Ideation Contests
- Authors:
- Jiang, Juncai
Wang, Yu - Abstract:
- Abstract : Ideation contests are commonly used across public and private sectors to generate new ideas for solving problems, creating designs, and improving products or processes. In such a contest, a firm or an organization (the seeker) outsources an ideation task online to a distributed population of independent agents (solvers) in the form of an open call. Solvers compete to exert efforts and the one with the best solution wins a bounty. In evaluating solutions, the seeker typically has subjective taste that is unobservable to solvers. In practice, the seeker often provides solvers with feedback, which discloses useful information about her private taste. In this study, we develop a game‐theoretic model of feedback in unblind ideation contests, where solvers' solutions and the seeker's feedback are publicly visible by all. We show that feedback plays an informative role in mitigating the information asymmetry between the seeker and solvers, thereby inducing solvers to exert more efforts in the contest. We also show that some key contest and solver characteristics (CSC, including contest reward, contest duration, solver expertise, and solver population) have a direct effect on solver effort. Interestingly, by endogenizing the seeker's feedback decision, we find that the optimal feedback volume increases with contest reward, contest duration, solver expertise, but decreases with solver population. Thus, CSC elements also have an indirect effect on solvers' effort level,Abstract : Ideation contests are commonly used across public and private sectors to generate new ideas for solving problems, creating designs, and improving products or processes. In such a contest, a firm or an organization (the seeker) outsources an ideation task online to a distributed population of independent agents (solvers) in the form of an open call. Solvers compete to exert efforts and the one with the best solution wins a bounty. In evaluating solutions, the seeker typically has subjective taste that is unobservable to solvers. In practice, the seeker often provides solvers with feedback, which discloses useful information about her private taste. In this study, we develop a game‐theoretic model of feedback in unblind ideation contests, where solvers' solutions and the seeker's feedback are publicly visible by all. We show that feedback plays an informative role in mitigating the information asymmetry between the seeker and solvers, thereby inducing solvers to exert more efforts in the contest. We also show that some key contest and solver characteristics (CSC, including contest reward, contest duration, solver expertise, and solver population) have a direct effect on solver effort. Interestingly, by endogenizing the seeker's feedback decision, we find that the optimal feedback volume increases with contest reward, contest duration, solver expertise, but decreases with solver population. Thus, CSC elements also have an indirect effect on solvers' effort level, with feedback volume mediating this effect. Employing a dataset from Zhubajie.com, a leading online ideation platform in China, we find empirical evidence that is consistent with these theoretical predictions. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Production and operations management. Volume 29:Issue 2(2020)
- Journal:
- Production and operations management
- Issue:
- Volume 29:Issue 2(2020)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 29, Issue 2 (2020)
- Year:
- 2020
- Volume:
- 29
- Issue:
- 2
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2020-0029-0002-0000
- Page Start:
- 481
- Page End:
- 500
- Publication Date:
- 2019-11-11
- Subjects:
- ideation contest -- feedback -- information asymmetry -- crowdsourcing -- contest and solver characteristics
Production management -- Periodicals
658.505 - Journal URLs:
- http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1937-5956 ↗
http://www.poms.org/journal ↗
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121568272/home ↗
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ ↗
http://www.umi.com/pqdauto/ ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1111/poms.13127 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 1059-1478
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 6853.076600
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library STI - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 17668.xml