Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit. (16th June 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Chen, Liwen; Zhang, Mengjia; Zhao, Shiwen
• Other Names: Ma Junhai Academic Editor.
• Is Part Of: Discrete dynamics in nature and society. Volume 2021(2021)
• Publication Date: 2021-06-16
• Subjects: System analysis -- Periodicals; Dynamics -- Periodicals; Chaotic behavior in systems -- Periodicals; Differentiable dynamical systems -- Periodicals; 003.05
• DOI: 10.1155/2021/5560671
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1026-0226

Abstract

Abstract : Existing building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green retrofitting in China. This paper establishes the perceived payoff matrix and evolutionary game model of the government, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), banks, and owners. Through simulation analysis, the primary factors affecting the choice of game strategy and the stable strategy under different conditions are discussed. The results show that the strategic choices of the government, ESCOs, banks, and owners influence each other in the two game models. Government regulations will have an impact on the strategic choices of ESCOs, banks, and owners. The owners' strategy choice is closely related to the perceived benefits and costs of retrofitting. Based on the results, corresponding suggestions are proposed to provide theoretical support for the development of the existing building green retrofitting market.