Strategic Delegation? How Legislative Political Elites Respond to Electoral Uncertainty. Issue 2 (19th May 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Vakilifathi, Mona
• Is Part Of: Legislative studies quarterly. Volume 46:Issue 2(2021)
• Page Start: 559
• Page End: 583
• Publication Date: 2020-05-19
• Subjects: agency design -- bureaucracy -- bureaucratic insulation -- electoral uncertainty -- legislative delegation -- legislatures; Legislative bodies -- Periodicals; Parlement; Procédure législative; Système parlementaire; Étude comparée (Descripteur de forme); Périodique électronique (Descripteur de forme); Ressource Internet (Descripteur de forme); 328
• DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12290
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0362-9805

Abstract

Abstract : What is the effect of electoral uncertainty on a legislature's preference for bureaucratic insulation? Previous research argues that an increase in electoral uncertainty results in an increase in a legislature's preference for bureaucratic insulation, delegation of a program to an independent agency or multiple agencies, for a government‐regulated program. However, there is disagreement among political scientists on how to conceptually or empirically measure electoral uncertainty and bureaucratic insulation. I use the common conceptual definitions of electoral uncertainty and bureaucratic insulation from the legislative delegation literature in a within‐subject experiment of U.S. state legislators and legislative staff to assess the causal effect of electoral uncertainty on their preference for one of the four strategies of bureaucratic insulation. Once a legislature is subject to electoral uncertainty, I find that the respondents are more likely to delegate to an independent agency and multiple agencies that collectively implement a program.