Political Philosophy and its Limits: A Response to de Shalit. Issue 1 (2nd January 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Murphy, Colleen
• Is Part Of: Australasian philosophical review. Volume 4:Issue 1(2020)
• Page Start: 32
• Page End: 44
• Publication Date: 2020-01-02
• Subjects: Ideal theory -- democracy -- public justification -- public reason; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 101
• DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2021.1876414
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2474-0500

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Avner de Shalit's central claim in "Political Philosophy and What People Think" is that political philosophers should take seriously the views of the public, but in practice philosophers do not do this. Moreover, philosophers lack adequate justifications for this lack of consideration. In my commentary, I first discuss de Shalit's rebuttal of arguments that claim political philosophy searches for the truth and the truth is not empirical, which overlooks, in my view, a central debate among contemporary political philosophers as to whether theorizing about principles of justice ought to be based on a consideration of empirical facts. I then articulate what I see as critical impediments to analytically trained political philosophers realizing the contributions to politics that de Shalit envisions, specifically in the form of identifying and constructively critiquing actual injustice. Finally, I suggest that even if the methodology of political philosophy is sufficiently revised to overcome methodological and training limitations, the notion of public will need to be complicated and the scope of critical examination expanded beyond the explicit arguments in favor of or against particular policies.