Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision. (7th June 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Yao, Haifeng; Fu, Jiangyue
• Other Names: Aguilar-Lopez Ricardo Academic Editor.
• Is Part Of: Mathematical problems in engineering. Volume 2021(2021)
• Publication Date: 2021-06-07
• Subjects: Engineering mathematics -- Periodicals; 510.2462
• DOI: 10.1155/2021/5554595
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1024-123X

Abstract

Abstract : Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.