Can the Paris Agreement deliver ambitious climate cooperation? An experimental investigation of the effectiveness of pledge-and-review and targeting short-lived climate pollutants. Issue 123 (September 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Cherry, Todd L.; Kallbekken, Steffen; Sælen, Håkon; Aakre, Stine
• Is Part Of: Environmental science & policy. Issue 123(2021)
• Page Start: 35
• Page End: 43
• Publication Date: 2021-09
• Subjects: Paris Agreement -- Pledge-and-review -- Short-lived climate pollutants -- Public good game -- Lab experiment.; Environmental policy -- Periodicals; Environmental sciences -- Periodicals; Environnement -- Politique gouvernementale -- Périodiques; Sciences de l'environnement -- Périodiques; Environmental policy; Environmental sciences; Periodicals; Electronic journals; 363.70561
• DOI: 10.1016/j.envsci.2021.05.004
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1462-9011

Abstract

Highlights: The Paris Agreement needs effective mechanisms for ramping-up contributions. We investigate pledge-and-review and starting with easier cooperation. Both ramp-up mechanisms fail to improve cooperation in our lab experiment. Starting with easier cooperation does not build greater trust. The pledge-and-review mechanism can act as a safeguard. Abstract: The ability of the Paris Agreement to achieve its ambitious long-term temperature goal depends on mechanisms that can promote a ramp-up of ambitions. Pledge-and-review may facilitate deeper cooperation over time by enhancing trust between parties. It has been proposed that starting out with easier cooperation that entails larger shares of domestic benefits, such as cooperation on short-lived climate pollutants, could also help promote the credibility and trust necessary for the ramping-up of contributions over time. Using a lab experiment we explore how these two mechanisms perform across two stages in a controlled and stylized setting where individual participants face incentives that mirror those of countries deciding on national contributions. We find that starting with easier cooperation does not produce higher levels of trust, and it leads to lower levels of cooperation when cooperation becomes more difficult in stage 2. The pledge-and-review approach does not, in itself, lead to significantly higher levels of cooperation, but it does offset the negative effect of starting with the easy cooperation. It can be seen as a safeguard against failed strategies.