Hans Blumenberg on the rigorism of truth and the strangeness of the past. (August 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kent, James
• Is Part Of: Thesis eleven. Volume 165:Number 1(2021)
• Page Start: 37
• Page End: 52
• Publication Date: 2021-08
• Subjects: Arendt -- Blumenberg -- Freud -- myth -- truth; Social sciences -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 301
• DOI: 10.1177/07255136211032832
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0725-5136

Abstract

In this paper I discuss Hans Blumenberg's The Rigorism of Truth, a short polemic that criticizes Freud and Hannah Arendt for placing (what he considers) a misplaced faith in the liberatory potential of rational truth in moments of historical disaster. The secondary literature suggests that this piece exhibits either all the signs of a late, Romantic capitulation to the 'need' for myth, or Blumenberg's failure to recognize his own faith and debts to the 'mythology' of reason's emancipatory hopes. My argument hinges on the claim that these readings put undue emphasis on the philosophical anthropology component of Blumenberg's work. Instead, I offer a new reading of the essay, in keeping with an alternative reading of his theory of myth. The essay transforms, then, from a polemic regarding the need for myth, into a nuanced description of the ways in which we can overestimate our capacity to overcome it.