Philosophical proofs against common sense. (5th May 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Frances, Bryan
• Is Part Of: Analysis. Volume 81:Number 1(2021)
• Page Start: 18
• Page End: 26
• Publication Date: 2021-05-05
• Subjects: disagreement in philosophy -- problem of the many -- metaphilosophy -- common sense -- metaphysics -- sorites paradox; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/analys/anaa039
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0003-2638

Abstract

Abstract: Many philosophers are sceptical about the power of philosophy to refute commonsensical claims. They look at the famous attempts and judge them inconclusive. I prove that, even if those famous attempts are failures, there are alternative successful philosophical proofs against commonsensical claims. After presenting the proofs I briefly comment on their significance .