'The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation': Frege on Distinguishing between Content and Force. Issue 2 (3rd April 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Textor, Mark
• Is Part Of: Australasian journal of philosophy. Volume 99:Issue 2(2021)
• Page Start: 226
• Page End: 240
• Publication Date: 2021-04-03
• Subjects: Frege -- content/force distinction -- propositional anaphora -- propositional questions; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1742748
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0004-8402

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Recently, the content/force distinction has had a bad press. It has been argued that the distinction is not properly motivated and that it makes the problem of the unity of the proposition intractable. I will argue that Frege's version of the content/force distinction is immune from these objections. In order to do so, I will reconstruct his argument that 'the nature of a question' requires a distinction between force and content. I will answer the concern about the unity of the proposition by outlining how the distinction can be combined with a Fregean account of the unity of thought.