A nuclear-armed North Korea without ICBMs: the best achievable objective. Issue 1 (2nd January 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Zhang, Hongyu; Wang, Kevin
• Is Part Of: Nonproliferation review. Volume 26:Issue 1/2(2019)
• Page Start: 143
• Page End: 153
• Publication Date: 2019-01-02
• Subjects: North Korea -- missiles -- disarmament -- East Asia -- regional security -- balance of power -- realism; 327.17405
• DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2019.1596574
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1073-6700

Abstract

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the North Korean nuclear crisis from a balance-of-power perspective. It is in the long-term interests of international peace for a secure and independent North Korea to serve as a buffer between US and Chinese ground forces. However, the conventional military advantage of the South Korean-American alliance over North Korea has grown drastically since the end of the Cold War, threatening North Korea's survival. Since North Korea lacks any reliable ally, nuclear weapons represent its most cost-effective way to restore a balance of power and thus secure itself. Accepting security guarantees in exchange for its nuclear arsenal is rhetorically appealing but not a viable approach. North Korea's development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), however, has overcompensated for the post-Cold War imbalance, inviting talk in Washington of waging a preventive war. Persuading North Korea to give up its ICBM capability, not its nuclear arsenal, should therefore be the primary objective of US diplomacy.