Reactor-grade plutonium and nuclear weapons: ending the debate. Issue 1 (2nd January 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Jones, Gregory S.
• Is Part Of: Nonproliferation review. Volume 26:Issue 1/2(2019)
• Page Start: 61
• Page End: 81
• Publication Date: 2019-01-02
• Subjects: plutonium -- highly enriched uranium -- fissile materials -- civil nuclear-power programs -- proliferation; 327.17405
• DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2019.1603497
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1073-6700

Abstract

ABSTRACT: The claim that reactor-grade plutonium cannot or will not be used to produce nuclear weapons has been used to justify non-nuclear-weapon states' large stockpiles of plutonium that has been separated from highly radioactive spent fuel. However, by using reduced-mass plutonium cores, it is possible to manufacture reliable nuclear weapons with reactor-grade plutonium. These weapons can have the same design, size, weight, and predetonation probability as weapons using weapon-grade plutonium and would require no special cooling. The increased radiation from reactor-grade plutonium could be easily managed by shielding and operational procedures. Weapons using plutonium routinely produced by pressurized-water reactors could have a lethal area between 40 percent and 75 percent that of weapons using weapon-grade plutonium. In the past, both Sweden and Pakistan considered using reactor-grade plutonium to produce nuclear weapons, and India may be using reactor-grade plutonium in its arsenal today. Despite claims to the contrary, the United States used what was truly reactor-grade plutonium in a successful nuclear test in 1962. The capability of reactor-grade plutonium to produce highly destructive nuclear weapons leads to the conclusion that the separation of plutonium, plutonium stockpiling, and the use of plutonium-based fuels must be phased out and banned.