Avoiding self-inflicted wounds to the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. Issue 1 (2nd January 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Boyd, Dallas
• Is Part Of: Nonproliferation review. Volume 26:Issue 1/2(2019)
• Page Start: 105
• Page End: 126
• Publication Date: 2019-01-02
• Subjects: United States -- deterrence -- stockpile stewardship -- nuclear testing -- credibility; 327.17405
• DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2019.1598033
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1073-6700

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Nuclear deterrence requires not only the reliability of a state's strategic weapons and the willingness of its leaders to employ them but also an adversary's appreciation of these conditions. Weapons perceived as failing to hold their targets at risk may lack deterrent value, just as retaliatory threats that are not believable may fail to deter, even if a state's operational capabilities are robust. Both the technical and political credibility of the US nuclear deterrent may have suffered self-inflicted harm since the end of the Cold War, often as casualties of intemperate policy debates. In particular, doubts have been sowed about the reliability of aging US warheads under a science-based stockpile-stewardship regime meant to substitute for nuclear-explosive testing. Likewise, the credibility of US deterrent threats may have waned as American leaders have spoken ever more stridently about the horrors of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism, underscoring their extreme aversion to the risk of nuclear attack. Diminished credibility in both spheres threatens to compromise US national-security objectives ranging from nuclear nonproliferation to the outcomes of nuclear crises.