Human interactive secure key and identity exchange protocols in body sensor networks. Issue 1 (1st March 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Huang, Xin; Chen, Bangdao; Markham, Andrew; Wang, Qinghua; Yan, Zheng; Roscoe, Andrew William
• Is Part Of: IET information security. Volume 7:Issue 1(2013)
• Page Start: 30
• Page End: 38
• Publication Date: 2013-03-01
• Subjects: authorisation -- cryptographic protocols -- personal information systems -- public key cryptography -- wireless channels -- body sensor networks; human interactive secure key distribution protocols -- identity exchange protocols -- body sensor networks -- wearable wireless sensor network -- sensitive personal information -- BSN security protection -- BSN characteristics -- human interactive empirical channel‐based security protocols -- elliptic curve Diffie‐Hellman version -- symmetric hash commitment -- knowledge protocol -- keys predeployment -- temporary trusted third parties -- BSN security design; Computer security -- Periodicals; Cryptography -- Periodicals; Computer networks -- Security measures -- Periodicals; Database security -- Periodicals; 005.8
• DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2012.0080
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1751-8709

Abstract

Abstract : A body sensor network (BSN) is typically a wearable wireless sensor network. Security protection is critical to BSNs, since they collect sensitive personal information. Generally speaking, security protection of BSN relies on identity (ID) and key distribution protocols. Most existing protocols are designed to run in general wireless sensor networks, and are not suitable for BSNs. After carefully examining the characteristics of BSNs, the authors propose human interactive empirical channel‐based security protocols, which include an elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman version of symmetric hash commitment before knowledge protocol and an elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman version of hash commitment before knowledge protocol. Using these protocols, dynamically distributing keys and IDs become possible. As opposite to present solutions, these protocols do not need any pre‐deployment of keys or secrets. Therefore compromised and expired keys or IDs can be easily changed. These protocols exploit human users as temporary trusted third parties. The authors, thus, show that the human interactive channels can help them to design secure BSNs.