Hardware Trojan attacks on voltage scaling‐based side‐channel attack countermeasure. Issue 3 (19th March 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Yu, Weize
• Is Part Of: IET circuits, devices & systems. Volume 13:Issue 3(2019)
• Page Start: 321
• Page End: 326
• Publication Date: 2019-03-19
• Subjects: invasive software -- cryptography -- combinational circuits -- sequential circuits; hardware Trojan attacks -- voltage scaling-based side-channel attack countermeasure -- cryptographic circuit -- voltage scaling technique -- SCA-resistant cryptographic chip -- sequential Trojan-infected chip -- power attack -- secret key -- side-channel attack-resistant cryptographic chip -- combinational hardware Trojan -- sequential hardware Trojan -- combinational Trojan-infected chips -- statistical models; Electronic circuits -- Periodicals; Electronic systems -- Periodicals; 621.381505
• DOI: 10.1049/iet-cds.2018.5087
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1751-858X

Abstract

Abstract : Here, the side‐channel attack (SCA)‐resistant cryptographic chip: a cryptographic circuit employs a voltage scaling technique is studied with hardware Trojan attacks. Two different types of hardware Trojans, sequential hardware Trojan and combinational hardware Trojan, are proposed to be embedded into the SCA‐resistant cryptographic chip for leaking the secret key. Moreover, the sequential Trojan can only disclose a single bit of the secret key at a time, while the combinational Trojan is able to leak the whole bit of the secret key at once. As demonstrated in the results, only analysing ∼270 (150) power traces are sufficient to disclose the 8‐bit secret key of the sequential (combinational) Trojan‐infected chip to the adversary. Furthermore, both the sequential and combinational Trojan‐infected chips can evade the testing of the power attack and be detected with the proposed statistical models successfully.