Power-sharing, conflict resolution, and the logic of pre-emptive defection. (July 2021)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Power-sharing, conflict resolution, and the logic of pre-emptive defection. (July 2021)
- Main Title:
- Power-sharing, conflict resolution, and the logic of pre-emptive defection
- Authors:
- Johnson, Chelsea
- Abstract:
- Conclusions about the potential for peace via power-sharing are mixed. For some, power-sharing does little to overcome the commitment problem characterizing a transition from conflict, while others argue that such concessions provide signals of parties' willingness to incur costs. This article develops and tests a new theory, aiming to shed light on the mechanisms through which power-sharing bargains help to overcome the commitment problem. I argue that government parties tend to hold an electoral and military advantage, which heightens incentives for rebel leaders to defect from a settlement prior to conceding their capacity to use violence. Where settlements provide discrete guarantees that offset the risks of electoral defeat and the co-optation of forces, these incentives for pre-emptive defection should be mitigated. I offer a novel disaggregation of provisional power-sharing subtypes, distinguishing between long-term and short-term arrangements. The analysis rests on an original, cross-national dataset of government-and-rebel dyads to negotiated settlements signed between 1975 and 2015 (N = 168). The logistic regression results clearly indicate that power-sharing settlements stipulating 'consociational'-style reforms are significantly more likely to resolve conflict between settlement dyads, all else equal. Meanwhile, standard conceptualizations of power-sharing, which include transitional coalitions and troop integration, appear unlikely to secure rebel commitmentConclusions about the potential for peace via power-sharing are mixed. For some, power-sharing does little to overcome the commitment problem characterizing a transition from conflict, while others argue that such concessions provide signals of parties' willingness to incur costs. This article develops and tests a new theory, aiming to shed light on the mechanisms through which power-sharing bargains help to overcome the commitment problem. I argue that government parties tend to hold an electoral and military advantage, which heightens incentives for rebel leaders to defect from a settlement prior to conceding their capacity to use violence. Where settlements provide discrete guarantees that offset the risks of electoral defeat and the co-optation of forces, these incentives for pre-emptive defection should be mitigated. I offer a novel disaggregation of provisional power-sharing subtypes, distinguishing between long-term and short-term arrangements. The analysis rests on an original, cross-national dataset of government-and-rebel dyads to negotiated settlements signed between 1975 and 2015 (N = 168). The logistic regression results clearly indicate that power-sharing settlements stipulating 'consociational'-style reforms are significantly more likely to resolve conflict between settlement dyads, all else equal. Meanwhile, standard conceptualizations of power-sharing, which include transitional coalitions and troop integration, appear unlikely to secure rebel commitment beyond the transition period, which helps to explain the contradictory findings in existing research. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Journal of peace research. Volume 58:Number 4(2021)
- Journal:
- Journal of peace research
- Issue:
- Volume 58:Number 4(2021)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 58, Issue 4 (2021)
- Year:
- 2021
- Volume:
- 58
- Issue:
- 4
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2021-0058-0004-0000
- Page Start:
- 734
- Page End:
- 748
- Publication Date:
- 2021-07
- Subjects:
- conflict resolution -- negotiated settlement -- power-sharing -- post-conflict democratization
Peace -- Periodicals
Conflict management -- Periodicals
International relations -- Periodicals
327.17205 - Journal URLs:
- http://jpr.sagepub.com/ ↗
http://www.uk.sagepub.com/home.nav ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1177/0022343320924699 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0022-3433
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 16379.xml