Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes. (9th May 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Decarolis, Francesco; Giuffrida, Leonardo M; Iossa, Elisabetta; Mollisi, Vincenzo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
• Is Part Of: Journal of law, economics, & organization. Volume 36:Number 3(2020)
• Page Start: 537
• Page End: 597
• Publication Date: 2020-05-09
• Subjects: Law -- Periodicals; Economics -- Periodicals; Organization -- Periodicals; Jurisprudence -- Periodicals; 340.05
• DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewaa004
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 8756-6222

Abstract

Abstract: To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in (a) time delays, (b) cost overruns, and (c) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings. ( JEL D73, H11, H57, L26).