How valuable is a legislative seat? Incumbency effects in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Issue 2 (11th April 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Micozzi, Juan Pablo; Lucardi, Adrián
• Is Part Of: Political science research and methods. Volume 9:Issue 2(2021)
• Page Start: 414
• Page End: 429
• Publication Date: 2021-04-11
• Subjects: Political careers, -- ambition, -- incumbency advantage, -- regression discontinuity, -- proportional representation, -- Argentina; Political science -- Periodicals; 320
• DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2019.52
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2049-8470

Abstract

Abstract: In many developing countries, national legislative seats are considered less valuable than (subnational) executive positions. Even then, ambitious politicians may seek a legislative seat either (a) as a window of opportunity for jumping to an executive office; or (b) as a consolation prize when no better option is available. Using a regression discontinuity design adapted to a pr setting, we examine these possibilities in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2011. In line with the consolation prize story, we find that marginal candidates from the Peronist party—which controls most provincial governorships—are more likely to be renominated and serve an additional term in the legislature, but not necessarily to jump to an executive office. The effect is stronger in small provinces.