Mathematical Entities without Objects. On Realism in Mathematics and a Possible Mathematization of (Non)Platonism: Does Platonism Dissolve in Mathematics?. (18th April 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Paul, Thierry
• Editors: Fludernik, Monika; Middeke, Martin; Buchleitner, Andreas
• Is Part Of: European review. Volume 29:Number 2(2021)
• Page Start: 253
• Page End: 273
• Publication Date: 2021-04-18
• Subjects: Learned institutions and societies -- Europe -- Periodicals; 940
• DOI: 10.1017/S1062798720000393
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1062-7987

Abstract

Abstract : By looking at three significant examples in analysis, geometry and dynamical systems, I propose the possibility of having two levels of realism in mathematics: the upper one, the one of entities; and a subordinated ground one, the one of objects. The upper level (entities) is more the one of 'operations', of mathematics in action, of the dynamics of mathematics, whereas the ground floor (objects) is more dedicated to culturally well-defined objects inherited from our perception of the physical or real world. I will show that the upper level is wider than the ground level, therefore foregrounding the possibility of having in mathematics entities without underlying objects. In the three examples treated in this article, this splitting of levels of reality is created directly by the willingness to preserve different symmetries, which take the form of identities or equivalences. Finally, it is proposed that mathematical Platonism is – in fine – a true branch of mathematics in order for mathematicians to avoid the temptation of falling into the Platonist alternative 'everything is real'/'nothing is real'.