A Critique of Thaddeus Metz's Modal Relational Account of Moral Status. Issue 162 (1st March 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Samuel, Olusegun Steven; Fayemi, Ademola Kazeem
• Is Part Of: Theoria. Volume 67:Issue 162(2020)
• Page Start: 28
• Page End: 44
• Publication Date: 2020-03-01
• Subjects: Africa -- capability -- environmental ethics -- modal relationalism -- moral status -- species populations -- Thaddeus Metz; Arts -- Periodicals; Humanities -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Periodicals; Political science -- Periodicals; 082
• DOI: 10.3167/th.2020.6716202
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0040-5817

Abstract

Abstract: This article is a critique of Thaddeus Metz's modal relational approach to moral status in African ethics (AE). According to moral relationalism (MR), a being has moral status if it exhibits the capacity for communal relationship as either a subject or an object. While Metz defends a prima facie plausibility of MR as an African account of moral status, this article provides a fresh perspective to the debate on moral status in environmental and ethical discourse. It raises two objections against MR: (1) the capability criterion inherent in MR is not only exogenous to African thought but also undermines the viability of MR; and (2) MR cannot account for the standing of species populations. Both objections have severe implications for biodiversity conservation efforts in Africa and beyond.