A Frankfurter in Königsberg: Prolegomenon to any Future non-metaphysical Kant. Issue 4 (December 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Finlayson, James Gordon
• Editors: Iago, Garmon; Jones, Andrew; Roberts, Peri; Williams, Howard
• Is Part Of: Kantian review. Volume 25:Issue 4(2020)
• Page Start: 583
• Page End: 604
• Publication Date: 2020-12
• Subjects: right to justification, -- principle of justification, -- constructivism, -- Forst, -- Rawls, -- Scanlon, -- Habermas, -- non-comprehensive, -- non-metaphysical; Neo-Kantianism -- Periodicals; Periodicals; 142.305
• DOI: 10.1017/S1369415420000424
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1369-4154

Abstract

Abstract: In this article I press four different objections on Forst's theory of the 'Right to Justification'. These are (i) that the principle of justification is not well-formulated; (ii) that 'reasonableness and reciprocity', as these notions are used by Rawls, are not apt to support a Kantian conception of morality; (iii) that the principle of justification, as Forst understands it, gives an inadequate account of what makes actions wrong; and (iv) that, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, Forst's account veers towards a version of moral realism that is prima facie incompatible with Kantian constructivism. I then evaluate Forst's theory in the light of a distinction made by Sharon Street between restricted and unrestricted constructivism. I show that Forst has reason to deny that it is either the one or the other, but he is not able to show that it is both or neither. I conclude that the arguments Forst advances in support of his constructivist theory of the right to justification entail that it is a metaphysical and comprehensive conception in the relevant, Rawlsian sense. Forst's theory of the right to justification therefore fails to fulfil one of the main stated aims.