Hegel's Organizational Account of Biological Functions. Issue 3 (December 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Maraguat, Edgar
• Editors: Gambarotto, Andrea; Illetterati, Luca
• Is Part Of: Hegel bulletin. Volume 41:Issue 3(2020)
• Page Start: 407
• Page End: 425
• Publication Date: 2020-12
• Subjects: Philosophy, German -- Periodicals; Periodicals; 193
• DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2020.17
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2051-5367

Abstract

Abstract: Two concepts have polarized the philosophical debates on functions since the 1970s. One is Millikan's concept of 'proper function', meant to capture the aetiology of biological organs and artefacts. The other is Cummins's concept of 'dispositional function', designed to account for the real work that functional devices perform within a system. In this paper I locate Hegel's concept of biological function in the context of those debates. Admittedly, Hegel's concept is 'etiological', since in his account the existence of purposive organs is explained by appeal to their purpose, yet, against Millikan's concept, Hegel's does not presuppose the phenomenon of natural selection nor derives the function of tokens from the function of types. So, my aim is, first, to present Hegel's approach to biological functions as one neither purely etiological nor purely dispositional. It will appear rather as an example of an organizational account (as those advocated today by McLaughlin, Mossio and others), that attributes function according to present performances (unlike etiological accounts) and emphasizes the role of functional parts in their self-production within the system they belong to (unlike dispositional accounts). Finally, I briefly discuss how Hegel's concept performs against common objections to organizational accounts.