Evolutionary game for the stakeholders in livestock pollution control based on circular economy. (1st February 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Yunan, Xue; Weixin, Luan; Yujie, Yang; Hui, Wang
• Is Part Of: Journal of cleaner production. Volume 282(2021)
• Publication Date: 2021-02-01
• Subjects: Environmental management -- Evolutionary game -- Circular industrial chain -- Resource utilization -- Stability strategy; Factory and trade waste -- Management -- Periodicals; Manufactures -- Environmental aspects -- Periodicals; Déchets industriels -- Gestion -- Périodiques; Usines -- Aspect de l'environnement -- Périodiques; 628.5
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.125403
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0959-6526

Abstract

Abstract: The circular economy model is an important way to control the pollution of livestock and poultry. Based on the perspective of the circular industrial chain, the stakeholders of enterprises, governments, and consumers in the resource treatment of livestock and poultry wastes are incorporated into an evolutionary game system to explore the interaction results between network cooperation subjects in the circular economy. This provides scientific management policy support for the stable operation of the circular model and the realization of livestock and poultry pollution control. We examine the mutual influence of the behavior and the game stability strategy of enterprises, governments, and consumers on the circular economy, and explore the stable operation of the model to achieve pollution control. Under certain conditions, the evolutionary stability strategy of the behavior game is composed of four pure strategy combinations. Among them, the optimal evolutionary stability strategy indicates that the government does not regulate the circular economy, and that enterprises and consumers support the circular economy. With this behavioral strategy, the circular economy can help contain the pollution control of livestock and poultry. Achieving pollution control by a circular economy depends on a market mechanism, which affects the cost-effectiveness of the circular model through price mechanisms. The price of the resource product affects consumers' purchase decisions, which in turn dictates how enterprises adopt the circular economy model. The carbon trading price affects the benefit of carbon emission reduction, and the price of raw materials and equipment affect the implementation cost of the model.