Corruption as a Self-Reinforcing Trap: Implications for Reform Strategy. (13th June 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Stephenson, Matthew C
• Is Part Of: World Bank research observer. Volume 35:Number 2(2020)
• Page Start: 192
• Page End: 226
• Publication Date: 2020-06-13
• Subjects: Corruption -- self-reinforcing behavior -- big bang -- incrementalism -- reform strategy; Economic development -- Periodicals; Developing countries -- Economic conditions -- Periodicals; Economic development; Economic history; Developing countries; Periodicals; 330
• DOI: 10.1093/wbro/lkaa003
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0257-3032

Abstract

Abstract: Corruption is widely believed to be a self-reinforcing phenomenon, in the sense that the incentive to engage in corrupt acts increases as corruption becomes more widespread. Some argue that corruption's self-reinforcing property necessarily implies that incremental anticorruption reforms cannot be effective, and that the only way to escape a high-corruption equilibrium "trap" is through a so-called "big bang" or "big push." However, corruption's self-reinforcing property does not logically entail the necessity of a big bang approach to reform. Indeed, corruption's self-reinforcing property may strengthen the case for pursuing sustained, cumulative incremental reforms. While there may be other reasons to prefer a big bang approach to an incremental approach, this conclusion cannot be grounded solely or primarily on corruption's self-reinforcing character.