What's left for the neo-Copenhagen theorist. (November 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Dascal, Michael
• Is Part Of: Studies in history and philosophy of modern physics. Volume 72(2020)
• Page Start: 310
• Page End: 321
• Publication Date: 2020-11
• Subjects: Physics -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Physics -- History -- Periodicals; 530.01
• DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsb.2019.10.005
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1355-2198

Abstract

Abstract: Frauchiger and Renner (2018) argue that no 'single-world' theory can consistently maintain quantum mechanical predictions for all systems. Following Bub (2017, 2018, 2019), I argue here that this is overstated, and use their result to develop a framework for neo-Copenhagen theories that avoid the problem. To describe the framework I introduce two concepts, ontological information deficits, and information frames, and explore how these may ultimately be fleshed out by the theorist. I then consider some immediate worries that may be raised against the framework, and conclude by looking at how some existing theories may be seen to fit into it. Highlights: Neo-Copenhagen theories can avoid Frauchiger-Renner type inconsistency. Introduction of a unifying framework for neo-Copenhagen theories. Probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics need not be instrumentalist.