Credence: A Belief-First Approach. Issue 5 (27th July 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Moon, Andrew; Jackson, Elizabeth
• Is Part Of: Canadian journal of philosophy. Volume 50:Issue 5(2020)
• Page Start: 652
• Page End: 669
• Publication Date: 2020-07-27
• Subjects: Credence, -- belief, -- confidence, -- epistemic probability, -- epistemic modals, -- animal concepts; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1017/can.2020.9
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0045-5091

Abstract

Abstract: This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible than many have previously supposed.