The Logic of Conditional Belief. (20th April 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Eva, Benjamin
• Is Part Of: Philosophical quarterly. Volume 70:Number 281(2020:Oct.)
• Page Start: 759
• Page End: 779
• Publication Date: 2020-04-20
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqaa008
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8094

Abstract

Abstract: The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker's semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing the logic of the Ramseyan indicative conditional.