Against Person Essentialism. Issue 515 (29th June 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Olson*, Eric T; Witt, Karsten
• Is Part Of: Mind. Volume 129:Issue 515(2020)
• Page Start: 715
• Page End: 735
• Publication Date: 2020-06-29
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy; Periodicals; 190.5
• DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa016
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0026-4423

Abstract

Abstract: It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with dementia.