Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism. (4th August 2018)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism. (4th August 2018)
- Main Title:
- Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism
- Authors:
- Khalifa, Kareem
Doble, Gabriel
Millson, Jared - Abstract:
- Abstract: Recent literature on non-causal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position. 1 Introduction 2 Change-Relating Monism's Three Problems 3 Dependency and Monism: Unhappy Together 4 Another Challenge: Counterfactual Incidentalism 4.1 High-grade necessity 4.2 Unity in diversity 5 Conclusion
- Is Part Of:
- British journal for the philosophy of science. Volume 71:Number 4(2020)
- Journal:
- British journal for the philosophy of science
- Issue:
- Volume 71:Number 4(2020)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 71, Issue 4 (2020)
- Year:
- 2020
- Volume:
- 71
- Issue:
- 4
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2020-0071-0004-0000
- Page Start:
- 1439
- Page End:
- 1460
- Publication Date:
- 2018-08-04
- Subjects:
- Science -- Philosophy -- Periodicals
501 - Journal URLs:
- https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/bjps/current ↗
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/ ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1093/bjps/axy048 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0007-0882
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 2316.000000
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 15083.xml