Frock Coats against Brass Hats? Politicians, the Military and the War in Afghanistan 2001–2014. Issue 3 (21st April 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Dixon, Paul
• Is Part Of: Parliamentary affairs. Volume 73:Issue 3(2020)
• Page Start: 651
• Page End: 691
• Publication Date: 2019-04-21
• Subjects: Civil-military relations -- Chilcot inquiry -- Counterinsurgency -- Iraq -- Military -- Strategic narrative; Representative government and representation -- Periodicals; Legislative bodies -- Periodicals; Great Britain -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; Legislative bodies; Political science; Representative government and representation; Great Britain; Periodicals; Periodicals; 328.4105
• DOI: 10.1093/pa/gsz015
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-2290

Abstract

Abstract: The 'Dominant Military Narrative' (DMN) on the Iraq and Afghan wars defends the effectiveness of the British military and its use of force by deflecting responsibility for failure onto the politicians and 'Whitehall'. The politicians are blamed for over-stretching the military by fighting two wars, resulting in a shortage of equipment, inadequate troop numbers and without a clear 'Strategic Narrative'. This article critiques the DMN and provides evidence to suggest that it was the military elite that sought maximum involvement in the Iraq and Afghan wars. The problem is that the military has too much rather than too little power to shape policy.