Summa Contra Scepticos. (24th April 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kusch, Martin
• Is Part Of: Philosophical quarterly. Volume 68:Number 270(2018:Jan.)
• Page Start: 184
• Page End: 193
• Publication Date: 2017-04-24
• Subjects: epistemic scepticism -- hinge epistemology -- epistemic disjunctivism -- Duncan Pritchard -- Ludwig Wittgenstein; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqx017
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8094

Abstract

Abstract: This critical notice concerns Duncan Pritchard's Epistemic Angst (2016). After a summary of the book, I offer some brief critical comments on five issues: the distinction between overriding and undercutting strategies against scepticism, epistemic relativism, foundationalist hinge epistemology, the relationship between hinge propositions and evidence, and the universality of rational evaluation. Epistemic Angst is Duncan Pritchard's to-date most comprehensive attempt to defuse Cartesian epistemic scepticism (= ES). The argument builds on Pritchard's more than sixty previous publications on the same general topic. Given limitations of space, this critical notice will nevertheless focus on Epistemic Angst alone. I shall also confine myself to a discussion of Pritchard's own position, leaving aside his criticisms of other views.