Effect of intermediate defense measures in voluntary vaccination games. (9th September 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Iwamura, Yoshiro; Tanimoto, Jun; Fukuda, Eriko
• Is Part Of: Journal of statistical mechanics. (2016:Sep.)
• Publication Date: 2016-09-09
• Subjects: Statistical mechanics -- Periodicals; Mechanics -- Statistical methods -- Periodicals; 530.1305
• DOI: 10.1088/1742-5468/2016/09/093501
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1742-5468

Abstract

Abstract: We build a model to reproduce the decision-making process of getting a vaccination based on the evolutionary game theory dovetailed with the SIR model for epidemic spreading. Unlike the two extreme options of whether or not getting a vaccination leads to perfect immunity, we consider whether 'intermediate defense measures' including masking, gargling, and hand-washing lead to imperfect effects of preventing infection. We consider introducing not only a 'third strategy' as a discrete intermediate measure but also a continuous strategy space connecting the cases of getting and not getting a vaccination. Interestingly, our evolutionary analysis suggests that the introduction of intermediate measures makes no difference for the case of a 2-strategy system in which only either getting or not getting a vaccination is allowed, even does not ameliorate, or say, gets worse to prevent spreading a disease. This seems quite different from what was observed in 2-player and 2-strategy (2 × 2) prisoner's dilemma (PD) games with relatively stronger chicken-type dilemma than the stag-hunt one in which the introduction of middle-course strategies significantly enhances cooperation.