A Modal Account of Essence. (7th September 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: De, Michael
• Is Part Of: Metaphysics. Volume 3:Number 1(2020)
• Page Start: 17
• Page End: 32
• Publication Date: 2020-09-07
• Subjects: essence -- qualitative -- intrinsicality -- sparsity; 110
• DOI: 10.5334/met.33
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2515-8279

Abstract

According to the simple modal account of essence, an object has a property essentially just in case it has it in every world in which it exists. As many have observed, the simple modal account is implausible for a number of reasons. This has led to various proposals for strengthening the account, for example, by adding a restriction to the intrinsic or sparse properties. I argue, however, that these amendments to the simple modal account themselves fail. Drawing on lessons from these failures, I propose a new version of a modal account, inspired by Ruth Barcan Marcus's defense of the coherence of quantified modal logic, according to which an object has a property essentially just in case (i) it has it in every world in which it exists, (ii) the property is discriminating (or non-trivial), and (iii) the property is qualitative. The resulting account of essence does not face any of the standard objections other accounts face, and I defend it from other potential objections.