An Incentive Mechanism Model of Credit Behavior of SMEs Based on the Perspective of Credit Default Swaps. (2nd December 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Wu, Shenghong; Mu, Pei; Shen, Jiaxian; Wang, Wenyi
• Other Names: Li Shouwei Academic Editor.
• Is Part Of: Complexity. Volume 2020(2020)
• Publication Date: 2020-12-02
• Subjects: Chaotic behavior in systems -- Periodicals; Complexity (Philosophy) -- Periodicals; 003
• DOI: 10.1155/2020/6639636
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1076-2787

Abstract

Abstract : The rapid development of credit default swap (CDS) market has changed the manner of credit risk management of banks to some extent and has had a new influence on the bank-enterprise credit model. In this study, the credit financing process of credit risk in small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) gathers within a bank, which makes it difficult for SMEs to raise funds. On the basis of the perspective of CDS, we construct an incentive game model of bank-enterprise credit behavior and analyze the influence mechanism of the credit financing of SMEs on CDS contract coupon rate, CDS payout ratio, bank-enterprise credit effort, and loan recovery rate when considering CDS. The result shows that the CDS contract leads to insufficient supervision after a bank loan, the moral hazard of the SMEs rises, and the probability of credit default events increases. In addition, in view of CDS, the SMEs can access more credit funds.