Valence, Elections, and Legislative Institutions. Issue 3 (18th April 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Patty, John W.; Schibber, Constanza F.; Penn, Elizabeth Maggie; Crisp, Brian F.
• Is Part Of: American journal of political science. Volume 63:Issue 3(2019)
• Page Start: 563
• Page End: 576
• Publication Date: 2019-04-18
• Subjects: Political science -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; Computer network resources; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12429
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0092-5853

Abstract

Abstract: To the degree that voters care about competence, expertise, and other valence characteristics of their representatives and political parties care about winning elections, parties have an incentive to signal that their legislators have such characteristics. We construct a model of parties, motivated by both reelection and by policy, that attempt to signal individual incumbents' valences to voters through the assignment of these members to positions of authority. The model illustrates how electorally motivated party leaders will have an incentive to promote less competent incumbents than they would if voters did not make inferences from promotion decisions. We derive the model's empirical implications and test them with original data on the careers of Chilean senators serving between 1998 and 2013. In support of the model's insights, we find that promotion to a leadership position is an effective signal to voters only if the promoted incumbent has extreme views relative to the party.