Beliefs do not come in degrees. Issue 6 (2nd November 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Moon, Andrew
• Is Part Of: Canadian journal of philosophy. Volume 47:Issue 6(2017)
• Page Start: 760
• Page End: 778
• Publication Date: 2017-11-02
• Subjects: Belief -- confidence -- degrees of belief -- partial belief -- degrees; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2017.1320201
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0045-5091

Abstract

Abstract: Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees (or that beliefs are graded or that there are partial beliefs). Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that beliefs do not come in degrees.