Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account. Issue 4 (29th May 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Mitchell, Jonathan
• Is Part Of: Canadian journal of philosophy. Volume 50:Issue 4(2020)
• Page Start: 505
• Page End: 523
• Publication Date: 2020-05-29
• Subjects: meta-emotion, -- emotion, -- Perceptualism, -- experience, -- intentionality; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1017/can.2019.47
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0045-5091

Abstract

Abstract: This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions—specifically their normative dimension—while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences.