Investor Rights versus Human Rights: Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Tilt the Scale?. Issue 3 (28th July 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bodea, Cristina; Ye, Fangjin
• Is Part Of: British journal of political science. Volume 50:Issue 3(2020)
• Page Start: 955
• Page End: 977
• Publication Date: 2020-07-28
• Subjects: bilateral investment treaties, -- human rights, -- democracy; Political science -- Periodicals; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1017/S0007123418000042
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0007-1234

Abstract

Abstract : This article argues that the broad and legally enforceable protection that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) offer to foreign investors worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. BITs lock in initial conditions attractive to investors that are linked to vertical investment flows and investment and trade competition. They also constrain the provision of welfare benefits or basic infrastructure. The lock-in and constraining effects are sources of popular grievance and dissent in states that host foreign investment. BIT-protected investor rights, however, limit the ability of governments to back-down vis-à-vis investors, lowering the relative cost of human rights violations. Finally, this study suggests that democratic regimes mitigate the negative effect of BITs. Evidence from 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009 supports the hypotheses.