A unificationist defence of revealed preferences. (22nd February 2019)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- A unificationist defence of revealed preferences. (22nd February 2019)
- Main Title:
- A unificationist defence of revealed preferences
- Authors:
- Vredenburgh, Kate
- Abstract:
- Abstract: Revealed preference approaches to modelling agents' choices face two seemingly devastating explanatory objections. The no self-explanation objection imputes a problematic explanatory circularity to revealed preference approaches, while the causal explanation objection argues that, all things equal, a scientific theory should provide causal explanations, but revealed preference approaches decidedly do not. Both objections assume a view of explanation, the constraint-based view, that the revealed preference theorist ought to reject. Instead, the revealed preference theorist should adopt a unificationist account of explanation, allowing her to escape the two explanatory problems discussed in this paper.
- Is Part Of:
- Economics and philosophy. Volume 36:Number 1(2020)
- Journal:
- Economics and philosophy
- Issue:
- Volume 36:Number 1(2020)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 36, Issue 1 (2020)
- Year:
- 2020
- Volume:
- 36
- Issue:
- 1
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2020-0036-0001-0000
- Page Start:
- 149
- Page End:
- 169
- Publication Date:
- 2019-02-22
- Subjects:
- rational choice theory, -- revealed preferences, -- causal explanation, -- unificationism
Economics -- Philosophy -- Periodicals
330.01 - Journal URLs:
- http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=EAP ↗
- DOI:
- 10.1017/S0266267118000524 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0266-2671
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital Store
- Ingest File:
- 14644.xml