Inductive Risk, Science, and Values: A Reply to MacGillivray. Issue 4 (23rd December 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hicks, Daniel J.; Magnus, P. D.; Wright, Jessey
• Is Part Of: Risk analysis. Volume 40:Issue 4(2020)
• Page Start: 667
• Page End: 673
• Publication Date: 2019-12-23
• Subjects: Argument from inductive risk -- risk assessment -- uncertainty analysis -- value‐neutral -- values in science; Technology -- Risk assessment -- Periodicals; 658.403
• DOI: 10.1111/risa.13434
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0272-4332

Abstract

Abstract: The argument from inductive risk (AIR) is perhaps the most common argument against the value‐free ideal of science. Brian MacGillivray rejects the AIR (at least as it would apply to risk assessment) and embraces the value‐free ideal. We clarify the issues at stake and argue that MacGillivray's criticisms, although effective against some formulations of the AIR, fail to overcome the essential concerns that motivate the AIR. There are inevitable trade‐offs in scientific enquiry that cannot be resolved with any formal methods or general rules. Choices must be made, and values will be involved. It is best to recognize this explicitly. Even so, there is more work to be done developing methods and institutional support for these choices.