Missing the mark: Dimona and Egypt's slide into the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Issue 5 (2nd September 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Elbahtimy, Hassan
• Is Part Of: Nonproliferation review. Volume 25:Issue 5/6(2018)
• Page Start: 385
• Page End: 397
• Publication Date: 2018-09-02
• Subjects: Egypt -- Israel -- 1967 Arab-Israeli War -- Dimona -- pre-emption -- Middle East; 327.17405
• DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2018.1559482
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1073-6700

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Did nuclear considerations play an important role in the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War? This research article seeks to answer this question by examining Egyptian decisions and conduct during the crisis preceding the war. The article argues that, despite long-standing Egyptian concerns over Israeli nuclear ambitions, the issue played only a marginal role in Egypt's path to war. Egypt's slide into war was a result of miscalculation rather than a deliberate plan to destroy Dimona. During the pre-war crisis, the nuclear dimension played only a minor role in Egyptian military planning. While a contingency plan to target Dimona was studied, it was never implemented. The article predominantly draws on Arabic-language sources, including first-hand accounts of Egyptian decision making during the pre-war crisis.