Explanation beyond causation? New directions in the philosophy of scientific explanation. Issue 2 (February 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Reutlinger, Alexander
• Is Part Of: Philosophy compass. Volume 12:Issue 2(2017:Feb.)
• Page Start: n/a
• Page End: n/a
• Publication Date: 2017-02
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12395
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1747-9991

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper, I aim to provide access to the current debate on non‐causal explanations in philosophy of science. I will first present examples of non‐causal explanations in the sciences. Then, I will outline three alternative approaches to non‐causal explanations – that is, causal reductionism, pluralism, and monism – and, corresponding to these three approaches, different strategies for distinguishing between causal and non‐causal explanation. Finally, I will raise questions for future research on non‐causal explanations.