Structural Indeterminacy. (24th April 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Torza, Alessandro
• Is Part Of: Philosophy and phenomenological research. Volume 101:Number 2(2020)
• Page Start: 365
• Page End: 382
• Publication Date: 2019-04-24
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Phenomenology -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12588
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8205

Abstract

Abstract : The threat of ontological deflationism (the view that disagreement about what there is can be non‐substantive) is averted by appealing to realism about fundamental structure—or so tells us Ted Sider. In this paper, the notion of structural indeterminacy is introduced as a particular case of metaphysical indeterminacy; then it is argued that structural indeterminacy is not only compatible with a metaphysics of fundamental structure, but it can even safeguard it from a crucial objection; finally, it is shown that, if there are instances of structural indeterminacy, a hitherto unacknowledged variety of ontological deflationism will arise. Unless structure is shown to be determinate, ontological deflationism remains a live option. Furthermore, I will consider whether structural indeterminacy could be challenged by adopting a naturalistic epistemology of structure; the question is answered in the negative on the basis of a formal result concerning theory choice. Finally, I submit a new way of articulating the epistemology of structure, which hinges on the very possibility of structural indeterminacy.