What really is the nature of suffering? Three problems with Eric Cassell's concept of distress. (6th July 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Duffee, Charlotte
• Is Part Of: Bioethics. Volume 34:Number 7(2020)
• Page Start: 695
• Page End: 702
• Publication Date: 2020-07-06
• Subjects: distress -- end‐of‐life -- pain -- person -- suffering; Bioethics -- Periodicals; 174.957
• DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12748
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0269-9702

Abstract

Abstract: Eric Cassell famously defined suffering as a person's severe distress at a threat to their personal integrity. This article draws attention to some problems with the concept of distress in this theory. In particular, I argue that Cassell's theory turns on distress but does not define it, which, in light of the complexity of distress, problematizes suffering in three ways: first, suffering becomes too equivocal to apply in at least some cases that Cassell nevertheless identifies as suffering; second, Cassell's account does not explain what sort of experience suffering is, resulting in theoretical and practical difficulties in distinguishing it from other medical conditions; third, there is good reason to believe that, in medical contexts, 'distress' just means 'suffering' or some cognate concept not yet distinguished from it, rendering Cassell's theory circular. I consider a rebuttal to my objections and reply, concluding that Cassell's theory of suffering needs a definition of distress to settle what the nature of suffering really is.