Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the "Field"*. (25th June 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Butler, Robert; Lenten, Liam J. A.; Massey, Patrick
• Is Part Of: Scottish journal of political economy. Volume 67:Number 5(2020)
• Page Start: 539
• Page End: 550
• Publication Date: 2020-06-25
• Subjects: bonuses -- effort -- incentives -- sport -- teams; Great Britain -- Economic conditions -- 1945-1964 -- Periodicals; Great Britain -- Economic conditions -- 1964-1979 -- Periodicals; Great Britain -- Economic conditions -- 1979-1997 -- Periodicals; 330.9411005
• DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12249
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0036-9292

Abstract

Abstract: This study explores the effect of bonus incentive mechanisms with a focus on how such a scheme influences aggregate production levels of teams of workers, specifically. We identify this using data from a highly competitive setting in professional sport, which involves a unique tournament design rule in an elite European rugby competition. The modelling results demonstrate qualified evidence that introducing bonuses to encourage teams to score via the most‐difficult, highest‐reward mode, incentivizes teams to increase effort to earn the bonus, and without reducing production after the bonus is achieved.