Concrete Ontology: Comments on Lauer, Little, and Lohse. Issue 1 (January 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kincaid, Harold
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of the social sciences. Volume 51:Issue 1(2021)
• Page Start: 40
• Page End: 47
• Publication Date: 2021-01
• Subjects: instrumentalism -- realism -- social ontology -- revealed preference theory; Social sciences -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Methodology -- Periodicals; Sciences sociales -- Périodiques; Sciences sociales -- Méthodologie -- Périodiques; 300.1
• DOI: 10.1177/0048393120925797
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0048-3931

Abstract

I share with all the other authors the view that conceptual metaphysics without close ties to science is of minimal value, that this holds for much of current work on social ontology, and that if there is value in social ontology, it has to be in contributing to empirical social science. I do perhaps disagree with all three authors about making any blanket statements concerning either instrumentalism or realism about the social sciences and their ontologies. I argue and try to show instead that if there are fruitful questions of social ontology, they are probably mostly local empirical issues raised by specific pieces of social science. Certain kinds of pluralism and instrumentalism may well make sense in some situations. I illustrate with debates over the need for psychological realism and revealed preference theory in economics.